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NOTES
DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND
THE NEW MEXICO PAROLE SYSTEM
Considerable attention has recently been focused on the American
penal system. Its deficiencies have been exposed and excoriated by
countless critics. Less scrutiny has been directed towards the operation of the equally important, but less visible, parole system.
Under traditional theories of parole, prisoners and parolees possess
few rights. Rather, parole is viewed as the granting of quasi-clemancy
to convicted criminals; and what the state has conditionally granted,
it may summarily withdraw with little pretence of adherence to the
principles of due process.
The courts have generally been reluctant to grant judicial review
to the grievances of prisoners and parolees. Consequently, what law
there is relating to the due process restraints imposed upon the
parole systems of the various states is largely negative. That is, most
courts have held that inmates and parolees are not protected by
constitutional safeguards in their dealings with parole boards. Administrative discretion is generally viewed as transcending the requiremints of due process in the area of parole. However, this traditional view is changing. Several recent decisions have held that rights
guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution are applicable to. situations involving the granting or
revoking of parole.
THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN NEW MEXICO TODAY
"Parole," as defined by New Mexico statute, means "the release to
the community of an inmate of an institution by decision of the
parole board prior to the expiration of his term, subject to conditions imposed by the board and to its supervision."' ,
This practice of releasing prisoners from correctional institutions
before they have completed serving their full sentence, is followed by
all of the states and by the federal correctional system. The purposes
of parole are to relieve the crowded conditions in prisons, and to
promote the rehabilitation of prisoners by allowing them to live
under supervision in the general community rather than in a penal
institution. Since most inmates of correctional institutions have
received their sentences as a result of anti-social behavior, the
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-14B (Repl. 1964).
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benefits to be gained by releasing them on parole must be balanced
against the possible harm to society that might result if such
prisoners are released before the expiration of their sentences. If the
possibility of social detriment exceeds the benefits to be gained by
releasing the prisoner, he is denied parole. On the other hand, if only
a minimal likelihood of harm to the community exists, and this is
outweighed by the positive aspects of granting an early release,
parole is usually granted.
However, each prisoner is an individual. Therefore it would be
impossible to formulate a rule, applicable in every case, to provide
for the mechanical review of each prisoner's record, and determine
whether or not he should be paroled. In order to inject the human
decision-making factor, which would consider and weigh the specific
of each
prisoner's case, and then fit these facts into the "comfacts
munity
detriment-prisoner/prison
system benefit" scale, boards of
citizens have been created to make parole decisions in the case of
each individual prisoner.
In New Mexico, the duty of screening prisoners who are eligible
for parole, and determining which of them are to be paroled, is
carried out by the Parole Hearing Board. 2 This board is made up of
five private citizens appointed by the governor. Appointments to the
Board are for staggered terms of five years or less, so that, commencing June 30, 1972, one member's term will end on June 30 of
each year.3
It is the duty of the Board to administer the State Probation and
Parole Act.' Under the act, the Board. is empowered to release on
parole any eligible 5 prisoner confined to a state-administered correctional facility.6
2.
3.
4.
5.

Stat. Ann. § 42-9-7 (Supp. 1971).
Stat. Ann. § 42-9-7 A (Supp. 1971).
Stat. Ann. § 41-17-12, 13, 14, 18, 21, 21.1, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 (Repl. 1964).
Stat. Ann. § 41-17-24 (RepL 1964):
... 1. Prisoners may become eligible for parole hearing after they have completed one-third of their minimum sentence; however, they must have a clear
conduct record for at least six (6) months prior to their appearance before the
parole board.
2. Prisoners having minimum sentences of ten (10) years or more shall be
required to serve one-third of ten years plus one month additional for every
year beyond a ten-year sentence before becoming eligible to appear before the
parole board.
3. Prisoners sentenced for thirty (30) years or more shall become eligible to
appear beforethe parole board after they have served seven (7) years of their

N.M.
N.M.
N.M.
N.M.

minimum sentence.
4. Prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment shall become eligible to appear
before the parole board after they have served ten (10) years.
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-14-24 (RepL 1964)
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The Board meets the second Thursday and Friday of each month
at the Penitentiary of New Mexico in Santa Fe.7 At these monthly
meetings the Board holds hearings on parole applications, parole
revocations and pardon recommendations. 8 In addition to the Board
members, these hearings are usually attended by the Director of the
Adult Probation-Parole Division of the New Mexico Department of
Corrections, and representatives of the Attorney General's office, the
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, the Penitentiary of New
Mexico, Project New Gate, and an Institutional Probation-Parole
Officer of the Adult Probation-Parole Division.9 These additional
personnel are present to furnish Board members with pertinent information regarding specific individuals who appear before the Board.' 0
By statute,' 1 the Board is not required to hear oral statements or
arguments by an attorney or any other person. The usual procedure
is that no one is permitted to appear on behalf of the prisoner.'"
However, prior to the scheduled date of the hearing, attorneys
representing prisoners and families of prisoners have access to Board
members. The Chairman of the Parole Hearing Board stated that it
was common for family members and attorneys to phone and visit
Board members at home and at work.' " In addition, any person
desiring to make a statement on behalf of a prisoner or parolee
scheduled to appear before the Board may visit the offices of the
Adult Probation-Parole Division in Santa Fe during the work week
and give his statement to the Director.' " A summary of the statement is made by the Director and entered into the file of the prisoner or parolee for consideration by the Board.' s
After each parole candidate has been interviewed by the Board,
the candidate is discussed and the Board votes to either grant parole,
deny parole, or deny parole but review the case in a few months.' 6
Parole may be granted by a vote of a majority of the appointed
board;' unanimity is not required.
7. New Mexico Parole Hearing Board, Procedures Manual, § 3(a), 4(a) (1971) [herein-

after cited as Procedures Manual].
8. Procedures Manual, supra note 7, at § 6(a).
9. Interview with Mr. Santos Quintana, Director, Adult Probation-Parole Division, Department of Corrections, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Apr. 3, 1972 [hereinafter cited as
Quintana Interview].
10. Procedures Manual, supra note 7, at § 12(b).
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-27 (Repl. 1964).
12. Interview with Mr. Victor Salazar, Chairman of the Parole Hearing Board, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Nov. 16, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Salazar Interview].
13. Id.
14. State of New Mexico, Adult Probation and Parole Division, Department of Corrections, Operations Manual, 3-11I-2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Operations Manual].
15. Id.
16. Procedures Manual, supra note 7, at § 13(a).
17. Id. at § 10(b).

July 1972]

EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM

If the Board determines that parole should be granted to a prisoner, the district judge from the judicial district from which the
inmate was sentenced must be notified.' 8 In practice such notification is given by mailing each district judge in the state a copy of the
docket of parole candidates to be considered at the upcoming
monthly meeting.' The judge may express his opinion regarding the
granting of parole to the prisoner, and his opinion is considered by
the Board. The final decision, however, lies with the Board. 2 0
On the other hand, if the decision of the Board is to deny parole,
the reason for such denial is indicated in the minutes of the meeting,
and is conveyed by a member of the prison staff to the prisoner in a
counseling session. 2 ' Informing the prisoner of the reason that
parole was denied him is a recent procedural innovation. Prior to
January, 1972, prisoners were not told the reason for denial.2 2
Among the factors considered by the Board in determining
23
whether parole is to be granted are:
a. Presentence report;
b. Present offense for which committed;
c. Mitigating circumstances of present offense;
d. Sentence imposed;
e. Expiration date of sentence;
f. Time served to date;
g. Prior criminal record;
h. Time left to serve on present offense;
i. Conduct in prison;
j. Psychiatric history;
k. Current physical and psychiatric reports;
1. Pending detainers;
m. Time elapsed since present felony and prior felony convictions;
n. Participation in educational, vocational, recreational, and
religious programs offered at the penitentiary;
o. Medical disabilities if any;
p. Military service and type of discharge;
q. If there is a drinking problem, participation in AA program in
prison;
r. If narcotics offenses indicated, participation in NA program in
prison;
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-24 (Repl. 1964).
Operations Manual, supra note 14, at 3-111-1.
N.M. Star. Ann. § 41-17-24 (Repl. 1964).
Quintana Interview, supra note 9; Procedures Manual, supra note 7, at § 15(b).
Salazar Interview, supra note 12.
Procedures Manual, supra note 7, at § 12(c).
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s. Participation in therapy programs available;
t. Desire to obtain parole;
u. Resentment or hostility;
v. Indications of sincere remorse for wrong doings;
w. Indications of favorable attitudinal changes;
x. Support and treatment of family;
y. Whether returning to family and if so, attitude of the family;
z. Number of job changes;
aa. Length of time in jobs;
bb. Job skills;
cc. Job offers;
dd. Compatability of job;
ee. Living conditions;
ff. Whether DVR plan, if any, is viable;
gg. If a New Gate student, likelihood of success.
If the Board makes a final determination that a prisoner should be
paroled, the prisoner must agree to certain conditions of parole before he is actually released. Typical of the New Mexico parole condi24
tions are the following:
Must abstain from alcoholic beverages and narcotics.
May not possess firearms.

May not associate with ex-convicts.
Must have parole officer's written permission to:
a. leave the county or the state
b. change residence or employment
c. get a driver's license
d. get married
e. get divorced

Must comply with all laws, statutes and ordinances

Must at all times act in an honorable manner as a good member of
the community.
May not correspond with inmates of any correctional institution.
Must submit monthly written report to parole officer.
May have parole revoked if, in the opinion of the parole board, it
would be detrimental to the parolee or the community to have
parole continued.

Before being released on parole, the prisoner must read, agree to
and sign four copies 2 5 of a Certificate of Parole, which contains a list
of the conditions of parole referred to above. One copy is retained
by the parolee.2 6 In effect the signed certificate constitutes an agree24. State of New Mexico, Adult Probation-Parole Division, Department of Corrections,
Certificate of Parole.
25. Operations Manual, supra note 14, at 3-IV-6.
26. Id.
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ment between the parolee and the state that the parolee is aware that
his parole will be revoked if any condition is violated.
This leads to the subject of parole revocation. During the time that
a released prisoner is on parole, he is subject to being returned to
prison if he violates any of the conditions of his parole or commits
an act in violation of any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance.
The Chairman of the Parole Hearing Board said that a verbal directive
has been given to all parole officers in the state that mere technical
violations of local ordinances or parole conditions are not sufficient
grounds for parole revocation. 2 7 Examples that were given of technical breaches were non-repetitious violation of minor traffic
ordinances (e.g. parking tickets), and temperate consumption of
alcohol in the parolee's own home.
Should the parolee be charged with a serious parole violation, 2 8
his parole officer may request that the local authorities arrest the
parolee and hold him in custody. 2 " The parole officer informs the
Director of the Adult Probation-Parole Division of the violation, and
conducts an investigation to determine the facts surrounding the
alleged violation. 3
If the parole officer's investigations lead him to believe that a
serious violation of the conditions of parole did in fact occur, the
parolee is returned to the Penitentiary of New Mexico to await a
parole revocation hearing. 3
This hearing is held at the next monthly meeting of the Parole
Hearing Board, if that meeting is held at least five working days from
the date of the parolee's arrest.3 2 Board policy is to give the parolee
at least five working days advance notice of the revocation hearing. If
arrested less than five working days before the date of the Board
meeting, the parolee's hearing is scheduled for the second monthly
meeting following his arrest. The stated purpose of the notice period
is to give the alleged violator time to prepare his defense, and to
consult with counsel, if he chooses. 33 However, parolees are not
27. Salazar Interview. supra note 12.
28. Operations Manual, supra note 14, at 3-VI-1:
(a). The following are considered serious parole violations...:
(1) Conviction of felony.
(2) Evidence of felony-type behavior without conviction.
(3) Conviction of misdemeanors endangering public safety.
(4) Absconding from supervision.
(5) Evidence of client being a detriment to the community.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 3-VI-2.
31. Id. at 3-V1I-5.
32. Quintana Interview, supra note 9.
33. Id.
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permitted to be represented by counsel at the hearing itself.3 4 -If, as
a result of the hearing, the Board finds that a violation did in fact
occur, it has the option of either revoking the parole, continuing the
parole, or entering any other order it may see fit. 3"
It should be pointed out that the parole revocation hearing is
essentially a fact-finding proceeding. Its purpose is to ascertain
whether the parolee is actually guilty of the violation with which he
is charged, and if so, whether there were any mitigating circumstances. Notwithstanding its trial-like function, it is classified as an
administrative hearing, and none of the rights guaranteed to
defendants in criminal prosecutions by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution are granted to the parolee. This area
of the law will be examined in depth below.
Before leaving this examination of the procedure followed by the
parole board in New Mexico, it is worthwhile to comment on the
amount of discretion conferred by statute on the Board in its parolerelated duties. The Probation and Parole Act is replete with reference
to the discretionary power of the Board, as can be seen from the
following examples.
The Board may release any prisoner not under sentence of death
when the prisoner gives evidence of ability to support himself and
"the Board finds IN ITS OPINION the prisoner can be released without detriment to himself or to the community." 3 6 (Emphasis
added.)
"The board, in the case of parole records ... IN THEIR DISCRETION, whenever the best interest or welfare of a particular.., prisoner makes such action desirable or helpful, may permit
inspection.. . by... the prisoner or his attorney."' '
(Emphasis
added.)
"An inmate should be placed on parole only when THE BOARD
BELIEVES that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a
law abiding citizen." ' (Emphasis added.)
In the case of a parole violation, the board may revoke parole,
continue parole, or issue any other order, "AS IT SEES FIT."' 9
(Emphasis added.)
DUE PROCESS AND THE PAROLE PROCESS
After viewing the operation of the process of granting, denying
and revoking paroles, two important points are readily apparent.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

N.M.
N.M.
N.M.
N.M.
N.M.
N.M.

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§ 41-17-27 (Repl. 1964).
§ 41-17-28 (Repl. 1964).
§ 41-17-24 (RepL 1964).
§ 41-17-18 (Repl. 1964).
§ 41-17-24 (Repl. 1964).
§ 41-17-28C (Repl. 1964).
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First, the Parole Board exercises tremendous discretionary power
over the lives of inmates and parolees, and there is no appeal from
the decisions of the Board.
Second, any Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections for prisoners
and parolees are completely absent from the entire parole process;
this is especially obvious with respect to hearings.
In view of these observations, one wonders whether the constitutional rights of the inmates and parolees are simply being ignored, or
whether due process requirements, in fact, are not applicable to
parole hearings.
In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to understand
the traditional view of parole and the status of parolees vis 6 vis the
correctional system. This view is typified by the following
theories: 4 o
1. The Right-Privilege Theory. When an individual is convicted of a

crime and sentenced to a period of imprisonment, he is obligated
to serve out his full sentence. Parole is an act of clemency, a
privilege granted by statute. It is not a constitutional right. Therefore, the state may establish whatever administrative procedures
it sees fit to grant or withdraw parole. Due process is not
violated, no matter how summary and arbitrary the procedures,
since the prisoner/parolee has no right to parole.
2. The Contract Theory. Prisoners are paroled subject to the conditions of parole imposed by the correction system on the parolees.
Agreement to abide by these conditions constitutes a contract
whereby the parolee agrees to return to prison to serve the
balance of his sentence if he should violate any of the conditions. By entering into such a contract, the parolee waives all
rights that he might have to due process.

3. The Constructive Custody Theory. This view of parole is based

on the theory that a parolee is still a prisoner. He is merely being
permitted to serve his sentence outside the walls of the correctional institution. If his conduct in the community proves
unsatisfactory, he would be transferred back into prison. This
transfer is perceived to be the same as transferring a prisoner
from one cell to another.
4. The Exhaustion Theory. The idea here is that the inmate or
parolee had the benefit of procedural due process at his trial,
where sentence was imposed. Therefore, as long as his sentence is
not lengthened, his right to due process is not violated by the
denial or revocation of parole.
With this rudimentary background in the ways in which courts and
parole system administrators have traditionally viewed parole, the
40. Note, Parole: Rights and Revocation, 37 Brooklyn L. Rev. 550 (1971); Comment,
Parole Revocation Hearings-Pro Justicia or Pro Camera Stellata, 10 Santa Clara Lawyer

319 (1970).
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holdings in the cases which will now be discussed may seem more
understandable.
In New Mexico, as in most states, parole is a creation of statute,
not of the Constitution. Therefore any rights that a prisoner has at a
parole hearing, or that a parolee has at a parole revocation hearing
must be conferred by statute. The courts have not been receptive to
arguments that basic constitutional protections are also applicable.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in the case of Robinson v.
Cox, 4 held that a parolee has no consitutional right to a parole
revocation hearing; any such right to a hearing would have to arise
under statute. While there is a statutory requirement that an alleged
violator be given a hearing to determine whether a parole condition
has actually been violated, 2 there is no requirement that the parolee
be allowed counsel. In fact, the court found that the Probation and
Parole Act expressly provides that the board needn't permit counsel
to appear before it at hearing.4 3 In denying the petitioner's request
for a writ of habeas corpus, the court in Robinson held that "neither
due process nor applicable statutes required that parolees be provided with appointed counsel or represented by employed counsel
when they appear before the parole board in a revocation hear4
ing." 4
Numerous cases from other jurisdictions have echoed the view of
the New Mexico Court in Robinson, that the rights afforded defendants by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in criminal trials are
not applicable in parole hearings.
In State v. Maxwell' S the Arizona Supreme Court reiterated that
in a parole revocation hearing the rights of the alleged violator are
conferred not by the constitution, but by statute, Courts also distinguish parole hearings from trial-type proceedings. The parole
hearing and parole revocation hearing are classified as administrative
proceedings. 4 6 The revocation hearing has been held not to be an
adversary proceeding.4 7 On that basis, it is differentiated from a trial
with its constitutional protections. Furthermore, it is not judicially
reviewable where a purely discretionary determination concerning
the withdrawal of a privilege is made.
The case that has gone the farthest in denying due process to
41.
42.
43.
44.

77 N.M. 55,419 P.2d 253 (1966).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-28C (Repl. 1964).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-27 (Repl. 1964).
77 N.M. 55, 59, 419 P.2d 253, 256 (1966).

45. 97 Ariz. 162, 398 P.2d 548 (1965).

46. Williams v. Field, 301 F. Supp. 902 (D.C. Cal. 1969), People ex rel. Ochs v. La
Vallee, 303 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1969).
47. People ex rel Smith v. Deegan, 303 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1969).
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prisoners and parolees at parole board hearings is Hyser v. Reed." I
There the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
persons appearing at parole board hearings have absolutely no rights
unless they are expressly provided by statute. In holding that the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution did not apply to
proceedings before parole boards, the Court said that it applies only
to criminal prosecutions, and that a parole revocation hearing is
neither a criminal prosecution nor an adversary proceeding in the
usual sense of the term. This decision expressly held that persons
appearing at parole board hearings have no right to court-appointed
counsel, are not allowed cross-examination, are not permitted to
learn the contents of the board's files by means of discovery, and
have no right to compel the presence of witnesses through compulsory service of process. It further held that a parole board is not
bound by rules of evidence, but that it may admit testimony and
evidence that would be inadmissible in a trial type proceeding.
While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the rights of a
parolee at a parole revocation hearing, it is interesting to note that
the majority opinion in Hyser was written by Circuit Judge, now
Chief Justice, Warren E. Burger.
From the foregoing cases, it can be seen that the salient characteristics of the traditional view of a parole board hearing are:
a.
b.
c.
d.

it is an administrative, rather than a judicial proceeding;
it is not an adversary proceeding;
the determination reached therein is not judicially reviewable;
any rights possessed by the person appearing before the board are
created by statute, not by the Constitution;
e. the determination reached therein is purely discretionary, relating
to the granting or withdrawal of a privilege.
Although the great majority of decided cases have espoused the
view that due process and the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment have no place in hearings conducted by parole boards, there is a
contrary line of cases. This line has developed slowly and is not
widely followed. Nevertheless, recent decisions from around the
country show that this minority view is gaining acceptance.
In 1946, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the same
court that decided Hyser seventeen years later), in Fleming v.
Tare,4 ' held that parolees have the right to employ counsel to
represent them in federal parole revocation hearings. This right is
granted by federal statute.5 0
48. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
49. 156 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1948); 28 C.F.R. § 2.41 (1971).
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Then in 1969, the Tenth Circuit, in Earnest v. Willingham, 5 ' held
that where parolees who were financially able to hire counsel were
statutorily allowed to be represented at parole revocation hearings,
indigent parolees should have court appointed attorneys. The court's
opinion was based on a due process argument, but it was implicitly
an equal protection argument. It will be remembered that Judge
Burger, in Hyser, rejected the contention that indigent parolees had a
right to court appointed attorneys.
The Supreme Court, in Mempa v. Rhay, stated that a defendant in
a PROBATION revocation hearing must be provided with counsel.
"Appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of
the criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected."" 3 The facts of the case indicate that under the
laws of the State of Washington, the sentencing judge at the probation hearing prepares a report to the State Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles. The Board determines the length of sentence that the probation violation is to serve, but the evidence in the case showed that
the Board's decision was usually influenced by the judge's recommendations.
It was the opinion of the Supreme Court that in order to present
his statement of the facts and mitigating circumstances to the judge,
the probation violator needed the services of counsel. In addition,
the prisoner's right to appeal the probation revocation was waived if
not exercised within a specified time period. The court felt that the
danger of an uninformed prisoner inadvertently waiving his right to
appeal was also strong reason why counsel should be required. The
Mempa case is frequently distinguished in cases deciding the rights of
prisoners in parole revocation hearing situations, on the ground that
Mempa dealt with probation revocation rather than parole revocation. The former is done only after a judicial hearing, while a parole
revocation hearing is an administrative process.
This distinction was rejected by the New York Court of Appeals
last year, in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State
Prison."s Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, said that the Mempa
principle is broad enough to encompass parole as well as probation.
A parole revocation hearing is an accusatory proceeding in which the
outcome-liberty or imprisonment-is dependent upon the board's
factual determination as to the truth of specific allegations of misconduct.
51.
52.
53.
54.

406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969).
389 U.S. 128 (1967).
Id. at 134.
27 N.Y.2d 376, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
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[W] hen all the legal niceties are laid aside, a proceeding to revoke
parole involves the right of an individual to continue at liberty or be
imprisoned. It involves a deprivation of liberty just as much as did
the original criminal action and ... falls within the due process sec-

tion 6 of Article I of our state constitution.
[T]he Supreme Court, rejecting all efforts to limit the right to
counsel to the narrow confines of criminal prosecution under the
Sixth Amendment, has treated such right as an essential element of
due process, applicable to all proceedings, whether they be classified
as civil, criminal or administrative, where individual liberty is at
stake.
No matter how the proceeding is characterized, the demands of due
process under both the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of
New York State require that a parolee be represented by a lawyer,
and entitled to introduce testimony if he so elects.
We find completely unpersuasive the contention that, since parole
is a mere "privilege," a matter of grace, and not a "right" various
constitutional guarantees, including the right to counsel, may properly be denied in a revocation hearing.
Even if a distinction exists between the components of the rightprivilege dichotomy,... when a state undertakes to institute a
proceeding for the disposition of those accused of crime it must do
so consistently with constitutional privileges, even though the actual
institution of the procedure was not constitutionally required." 5
The Menechino approach has been followed in several jurisdictions,' 6 albeit a minority. The importance of that decision and those
that have adopted similar reasoning is that they signal the beginning
of a judicial reassessment of the entire subject of parole and the
rights of parolees. Once the courts have admitted that due process is
an essential requirement of the parole system, then the logical next
step would be the extension of Sixth Amendment rights. To deny
these rights on the ground that a parole hearing, or parole revocation
hearing is an administrative proceeding, not a judicial proceeding, is
to say that the prisoners rights are determined by semantics. As
Judge Fuld said in Menechino, when a man's liberty is at stake, it is
of no comfort to that man to be told that the hearing at which his
fate is to be determined is merely an administrative re-evaluation of
the wisdom of extending the privilege (i.e. parole) of conditional
55. Id. at 453-55, 27 N.Y.2d at 382-84.
56. U.S. ax reL Bey v. Conn. St. Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); Goolsby
v. Gagnon, 322 F.Supp. 460 (E.D. Wisc. 1971); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328 249
A.2d 549 (1969).
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freedom that had been granted to him. Where a parolee's liberty is at
issue the stake is just too important to be left completely to the
unchallenged discretion of the parole board.
The argument that parole is a privilege, and therefore its denial or
revocation needn't conform to due process requirements may be
attacked, using non-parole cases as precedent.
In the case of Greene v. McElroy,"' which involved the government's withdrawal of the plaintiffs security clearance, the government denied that the plaintiff had the Sixth Amendment right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses. It was the contention of the government that a security clearance is a privilege, not a right, and that it
could be withdrawn without going through the formalities that
would be required by due process. In rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court held that although one may not possess a certain
right, once it is extended as a privilege it can be revoked only by
means consistent with due process.
Several recently decided welfare cases upheld this point. The
state's requirement that a person must be a resident for one year
before being eligible for welfare benefits was challenged in Shapiro v.
Thompson." ' The state contended that welfare payments were a
privilege and not a right, and that therefore the state could impose
whatever reasonable eligibility requirements it saw fit. The Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that "a constitutional challenge cannot be
answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a
'privilege' and not a right." 5 9
The following year, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 6 0 another welfare case,
the -Supreme Court said that welfare recipients' benefits could not be
terminated without giving the recipient an evidentiary hearing at
which he was entitled to be represented by counsel, offer evidence
and cross-examine witnessess. The fact that welfare benefits might be
characterized as a privilege rather than a right was irrelevant.
If the reasoning of this line of cases is applied by the courts to
parole revocation situations, as it was in Menechino, then the rightprivilege distinction, which is the main pillar of the due process
denial argument, is knocked aside. When that happens, parolees
rights will take a long stride forward.
A foundation for constructing a case for due process in parole
revocation hearings in New Mexico was laid in 1917 in Ex Parte
Lucero.6 1 The issue there was whether a suspended sentence may be
57. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).

58. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
59. Id. at 627.

60. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
61. 23 N.M. 433, 168 P. 713 (1917).
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revoked without a hearing. Regarding that question, the New Mexico
Supreme Court said:
Upon principle it would seem that due process of law would require
notice and opportunity to be heard before a defendant can be committed under a suspended sentence. The suspension of the execution
of the sentence gives to defendant a valuable right. It gives him the
right of personal liberty, which is one of the highest rights of citizenship. This right cannot be taken away from him without notice AND
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD without invading his constitutional
rights. 6 2 (Emphasis added.)
The court held that where a question of fact was involved and
revocation depended on the determination of factual issues, a hearing
must be granted.
This requirement of a hearing in all cases where personal liberty is
involved, becomes a requirement that an individual be granted the
right of counsel, when the mandate of Lucero is added to the statement of the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama.6 3
The Supreme Court declared in that case that the right to be heard
would be "of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel." 6 4
The result reached by a combination of the holdings of Lucero
and Powell is the requirement that in any proceeding in which an
individual stands to be deprived of his liberty and be committed to
prison, he must first be given a hearing at which he has the benefit of
representation by an attorney. Although opponents of this position
might argue that the type of proceeding involved in Lucero was
judicial, while a parole revocation hearing is merely administrative in
nature and therefore not subject to the same constitutional demands
as a hearing before a court, this contention was rejected as specious
by the New York Court of Appeals in Menechino.
There seems to be a logical inconsistency in the New Mexico law
concerning rights of the accused at parole revocation hearings as
compared to his rights at probation hearings. As was pointed out
earlier, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Robinson v. Cox,6 held
that since a parole revocation hearing is not a judicial proceeding,
and since a prisoner has no constitutional right to parole, parolees
have no right to representation by counsel at a PAROLE revocation
hearing.
Yet in State v. Brusenhan,6 6 which was decided by the New
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 438-39, 168 P. at 715.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id. at 68-69.
Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 419 P.2d 253 (1966).
78 N.M. 764, 438 P.2d 174 (1968).
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Mexico Court of Appeals two years after Robinson, it was held that
an individual does have a right to counsel at a PROBATION revocation hearing. This result was reached even though the court remarked
that "[p]robation is conferred as a privilege and cannot be demanded as a right. It is a matter of favor not of contract. There is no
requirement that it must be'granted. .. The court then went on to cite the Ex parte Lucero"8 holding
that liberty is one of the highest rights of citizenship and cannot be
taken away in a revocation proceeding unless the defendant has the
right to be heard. To do otherwise was held to be a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights.
While probation and parole might be technically distinguished on
the ground that the former is granted and revoked by the court
system, and the latter is granted and revoked by a non-judicial board,
the fact remains that in reality there is little significant difference
between the two. They both permit a convicted criminal defendant
to avoid completing a sentence in a correctional institution. Instead,
an individual released under either system is permitted to remain at
liberty in the community subject to the periodic supervision of his
probation or parole officer. Revocation of either probation or parole
means that the violator looses his, conditional liberty and is required
to serve his sentence behind prison walls.
The doctrine of Lucero would seem to apply in both cases.
Neither a parolee accused of having violated his parole, nor an individual charged with having violated his probation, should be deprived
of his liberty without having a right to counsel. It seems irrational to
permit one individual to be represented by an attorney at a probation revocation hearing, while denying another person access to an
attorney in a hearing to determine whether parole should be revoked.
Since both of the accused are granted a statutory right to a hearing,69 and since the Powell"I doctrine states that the right to a
hearing is meaningless unless the party to be heard has the right of
counsel, then the present practice in New Mexico seems to be
violative of due process and equal protection, guaranteed under the
constitutions of both the United States 71 and New Mexico.",2
The principal obstacle in New Mexico to judicial acceptance of the
argument that parolees have a due process right to counsel at parole
revocation hearings is the decision of the New Mexico Supreme
67. Id. at 765, 438 P.2d at 175.
68. Ex Parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 P. 713 (1917).
69. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-28C, 28.1B (Repl. 1964).
70. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

71. U.S. Const. amends. V,VI, XIV, § 1.
72. N.M. Const. art 11, § 18.

July 1972]

EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM

Court in Robinson v. Cox. In that case the court cited several federal
court decisions as authority for the proposition that due process does
not require that parolees be provided with counsel at parole revocation hearings. The court specifically cited the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Escoe v. Zerbst 7 3 as setting the tenor for
these holdings.
Further, the court rejected the contention that the New Mexico
statute denying parolees counsel at appearances before the parole
board is unconstitutional.
Lastly, the court abruptly distinguished Ex parte Lucero since that
case dealt with probation revocation, and not parole revocation.
The Robinson decision was dealt a serious blow in 1970, when the
Tenth Circuit, in Murray v. Page,7 4 held that state parole revocation
proceedings must comply with the due process requirements of the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically
making reference to Escoe v. Zerbst, the court said:
Subsequent determinations of minimal due process standards by the
Supreme Court have not embraced the theory proposed in Escoe.75
Therefore, while a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to
parole, once paroled he cannot be deprived of his freedom by means
inconsistent with due process. The minimal right of the
parolee ... to appear AND TO BE HEARD at the revocation hearing

is inviolate. Statutory deprivation of this right is manifestly inconsistent with due process and is unconstitutional. 6 (Emphasis
added.)
If the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Powell, that
it is meaningless to grant a hearing if the defendant is not afforded
the right to counsel at the hearing, is read alongside Murray, then the
Robinson rule faces an extremely uncertain future.
CONCLUSIONS
The present state of the law relating to the rights of prisoners and
parolees appearing at hearings before parole boards may be summarized as follows:
With respect to hearings held to determine whether parole should
be granted, all jurisdictions take the position that parole is a privilege
and may be granted or denied at the discretion of the board.
Prisoners have no Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in such a situation.
73.
74.
75.
76.

295 U.S. 490 (1934).
429 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1361-2.
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Concerning revocation of parole, the states are unevenly divided
into two factions. The majority adhere to the theory that parole
revocation is the mere withdrawal of a privilege. Therefore the
parolee has no constitutional rights in connection with such withdrawal. Whatever rights he may possess are created by statute, and
such statutes are generally strictly construed.
The minority view is that depriving the parolee of his conditional
status of freedom is so serious a step that it may only be carried out
with due regard for his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
of the Constitution. That is, the parolee is entitled at a minimum to a
hearing at which he has the right to be represented by counsel.
Earlier discussion brought out the fact that the New Mexico courts
have frequently asserted that this state is solidly entrenched in the
majority camp.
No well-founded allegation has been made that the New Mexico
Parole Hearing Board has been abusing its power or discretion by
arbitrarily revoking parole for minor violations of the conditions of
parole. This appears to be attributable to the conscientiousness
shown by the members of the Board and the personnel of the Adult
Probation-Parole Division in the performance of their duties in this
area. However, parolees should be able to rely on something more
concrete than scrupulousness to protect them from arbitrary or
vindictive revocations.
The writer urges that the rules of Robinson v. Cox be reexamined
in the light of the recent Menechino-type decisions, and that the New
Mexico courts adopt the theory that parolees have a right to due
process in parole revocation proceedings. This would include the
right to counsel at the revocation hearing.
The disruptive effect of such a policy change on parole hearing
procedure could be minimized by the application of the rule enunciated by the Tenth Circuit in Earnest v. Moseley' and Cotner v.
U.S.7 I In those cases, the court held that due process is not violated
by denying the parolee counsel at the revocation hearing, if the
parolee has admitted the alleged parole violation or where the facts
regarding the alleged violation are not contested.
Both the Chairman of the Parole Hearing Board and the Director
of the Adult Probation-Parole Division have stated that in the vast
majority of parole revocation situations, the parolee admits the violation with which he is charged and does not allege any mitigating
circumstances to justify the violation. 7 9 In such cases, the present
77. 426 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1970).
78. 409 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1969).

79. Salazar Interview, supra note 12; Quintana Interview, supra note 9.
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parole revocation procedure would continue unchanged. Only in
those relatively infrequent instances where the facts relating to the
alleged parole violation are in dispute would the parolee be entitled
to appear before the Board with counsel.
The proposed change offers the advantage of giving parolees a
greater degree of protection against arbitrary and capricious parole
revocation than they have at present, while at the same time, imposing no unmanageable administrative burden on the Parole Hearing
Board. 8 0
WILLIAM KELLIHER

80. In re Tucker, 486 P.2d 660, 681 n. 67, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761, 785 n. 67 (1971).
Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Utah; West Virginia, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, Washington
and the District of Columbia presently permit retained counsel at parole
revocation hearings.

